Abstract. The determiner many is analyzed relative to a notion of expectation that is introduced into contexts employed in the theory of generalized quanti ers. Issues concerning intensionality, vagueness, ambiguity and context change are considered along the way.
Introduction
The semantics of the determiner many can be speci ed within generalized quanti er theory as roughly many(A; B) i jA \ Bj > n (i) for some suitable lower bound n on the cardinality jA \ Bj of the set of A's that are B's. What is \rough" about (i) is n, an early proposal for which (due to Barwise and Cooper 3] ) is n = max(n 0 ; k jAj) for some number n 0 and fraction k (between 0 and 1). Motivated largely by Milsark's weak/strong-classi cation of determiners (according to which only weak determiners can occur in there-insertion sentences), Partee 11] argues for a decoupling of n 0 and k jAj, yielding two di erent readings of many: a weak cardinal reading, given by (i), with n supplied by the context; and a strong proportional reading many(A; B) i jA \ Bj > k jAj (ii) where this time the context contributes k. Under the assumption that a choice of context xes the parameters n and k independently of the arguments A and B of many, readings (i) and (ii) can then be di erentiated through various semantic properties. An example is symmetry: the conditions many(A; B) and many(B; A) are evidently equivalent under (i) but not under (ii) .
But what do such judgments amount to, given the underlying premiss that n and k are determined by context, irrespective of the arguments A and B of many? The question is somewhat delicate, as (i) or (ii) can only be defended by abstracting away the vagueness in many through a highly idealized notion of context that picks out a precise value for n or k. Vagueness aside, however, would it not be useful to have a notion of context where either (1a) or (1b) could be uttered truthfully, even if the talks had an identical audience (numbering fewer than a hundred)?
(1) a. Many people came to our talk.
b. Not many people came to Chomsky's talk. Perhaps more crucially, there is the matter of logical consequence, characterized customarily by universal quanti cation over ( xed) contexts is a logical consequence of ' i for every context c; if ' is true at c then so is :
With a view to shedding light on these points, the present paper investigates cases in which some notion of norm or expectation determines just how many is many. We do not claim that all uses of many can be explained along these lines (a question taken up at some length in x3:1 below). Even so we believe that it is instructive to inquire into how n and k might, in certain cases, arise.
The xed context assumption and extensionality
Let us begin with a remark from Barwise and Cooper 3] about generalized quanti er theory, which brings out a number of issues that will concern us.
One of the simplifying assumptions often made in the model theory is that one has a xed context which determines the meaning of the basic expressions. We can think of this context as providing an interpretation for non-logical determiners : : : In this paper we shall assume throughout that there is a rich context held xed that determines the precise meaning for basic expressions, even those like \most", \many" and \few". We refer to this as the xed context assumption. : : : The xed context assumption is our way of nessing the vagueness of non-logical determiners. We think that a theory of vagueness like that given by Kamp 1975] for other kinds of basic expressions could be superimposed on our theory. 4 We do not do this here, to keep things manageable.
We will turn to Kamp 6] b. Many houses in X were insured against re last year. In all these examples, the reasoning is the same; evaluate the pair many(A; B) and many(A In reply to these arguments, Partee 11] minimizes the non-extensionality of many, pointing out that \the only element of value judgment that may have to enter into the interpretation of simple many and few may be in determining a suitable value for n or k in the given context; but each such meaning, once n or k is xed, is clearly extensional." Sweeping non-extensionality under the rug of context, she proceeds to compare the situation with past attempts \to establish whether relative adjectives like tall and expensive are intensional (like good) or, as Kamp (1975) suggested and Siegel (1976) convincingly argued, vague context-dependent extensional adjectives." While we are a little unclear which passage in Kamp 6 ] lends itself to this interpretation, 1 the relevance of vagueness to many is obvious enough; as Partee observes, In normal usage it seems that we do not expect the context to narrow down the choice of n to a single precise value, but only to narrow it down enough to be communicatively useful. Now, if many is, as Partee contends, \clearly extensional" \once n or k is xed," then why dwell on the non-extensionality of many, when that nonextensionality can be con ned to parameters n and k that are indisputably vague? Should we expect a precise story about how n or k get determined, when they, in fact, do not get determined precisely? Without a clear conception of vagueness, the matter is bound to remain vague.
Vagueness and context-dependence
The analysis of vagueness in Kamp 6 ] is put very concisely in footnote 4 in Barwise and Cooper 3]. Kamp 's proposal is basically to evaluate a sentence with respect to a class of models, rather than a single model.
Although there is a bit more to Kamp 6] , this su ces to make the point that Claim 1. One need not worry about losing vagueness by positing models that resolve it away; vagueness can be recovered by constructing a context from a family of such models (being careful to distinguish the notion of a context from that of a model). Kamp 6] actually analyzes vagueness more directly in terms of a partial model, and passes to completions of it (corresponding to the aforementioned \family of such models") in order to de ne a probability function on sets of these. A function C is assumed that narrows truth gaps when fed a context, although not much is said about just what a context is, let alone where the function C comes from.
1.3. Partee's adjectival and determiner readings Returning to the word many, let us record Partee 11] 's analysis, before presenting our own. The cardinality reading (i) is exempli ed by assigning (4) the discourse representation structure (DRS) X Many(X) Students(X) Arr-today(X) (iii) where X ranges over plural objects. 
where 9 n x abbreviates \there are at least n x's" and n-is-many x ('; ) intuitively expresses that \n is many, for '-x's satisfying ." The rst conjunct (9 n x)('^ ) in the right hand side of (v) is a straightforward existential claim, the veri cation of which requires only the extensions of ' and (which are, in turn, treated in a symmetric fashion). The thorny conjunct is the second; it is here where lines (i) and (ii) diverge. Under the existential reading associated with (iii), the two arguments (' and ) of n-is-many x can be combined by conjunction, reducing our speci cation of many to a unary predicate n-IS-MANY x (applied to '^ ) describing many as an adjective n-IS-MANY x ('^ ) i n-is-many x ('; ) :
On the other hand, for the determiner reading (ii) of many, we will need both argument places of n-is-many x .
Treating many as a unary predicate
The adjective many is analyzed in (iii) not only as extensional but also as intersective. While this may do relative to a notion of context that xes the bound n in (i) independently of the arguments of many, the matter becomes quite di erent if the arguments are allowed to contribute to the calculation of the bound. These contributions must be encoded into the meanings the context assigns to the arguments and supplies when evaluating the utterance.
Claim 2. The context at which a sentence is uttered does not alone determine n in (i); n depends also on the arguments of many, which cannot be interpreted simply by their extensions. Claim 2 is crucial to our analysis, which proceeds from Claim 3. n C's are many when jCj could well have been < n.
More concretely, we o er a formalization of \could well have been" by probabilities. But what should the probabilities be de ned on? Should the variable x used up in making the factual assertion \there are n x's" be reintroduced again for calculating probabilities? This approach is blocked by, for instance, the Keenan and Stavi 9] example (2), which requires di erent measures for lawyers and doctors, even when they happen to be co-extensional. That is, Claim 2 essentially yields the corollary Claim 4. De ning probabilities on objects is inadequate to capture expectations behind many.
The basic intuition about what a norm is in the cases which concern us should make clear in which direction we have to look: for alternative situations, or possible worlds. 3 Accordingly, let us formalize Claim 3 in terms of a probability function p on sets of worlds (w; : : :) by the equivalence n-IS-MANY x ( ) i \it is probable that (9 <n x) " i p(fw : j j x;w < ng) > c where j j x;w is de ned to be jfx : in wgj. For now, let us assume only that p and c are xed by the model (independently of ), and relate our analysis of (v) to (i):
where, by de nition, j j x = jfx : gj | assuming when no world is speci ed that evaluation is carried out at the actual world | and n ;x = ( minfn : p(fw : j j x;w < ng) > cg if 9n p(fw : j j x;w < ng) > c 1 otherwise. As noted by C. Condoravdi, we lose the empirically problematic entailments (5) and (6) predicted in Partee 11] , under which many is (on its cardinality reading) persistent and monotonic. (5) There were many beach front houses that were ooded last year; thus, there were many houses that were ooded last year. (6) There were many students that came to the talk and asked questions; thus, there were many students that came to the talk.
Monotonicity and persistence break down because if either argument, ' or , in Manyx('; ) is weakened, the probability p(fw : j'^ j x;w < ng) could well fall below c, raising n '^ ;x . (The failure of these properties is una ected by a strengthening of 0 to 2( 0 ).) On the positive side, a property that we may wish to meet is illustrated by (7), assuming for simplicity that there were at least two such houses. (7) Many houses in X burned down last year; in fact, all houses in X burned down last year. An account of the felicity of the use of in fact above requires a di erent (noncardinal) reading of many.
Treating many as a binary relation
Turning to the duplex analysis (iv), note that the discourse markers introduced by the restrictor remain available within the nuclear scope. In cases of intensionality, the contextual update may consist also of narrowing the collection of possible worlds on which probabilities (and n-is-many x ('; )) are de ned. Recall that the conditional probability p(XjY ) of X given Y , de ned as p (X\Y ) p(Y ) provided p(Y ) 6 = 0 (unde ned, otherwise), is designed to adjust the probabilities p to a domain obtained by intersection with Y .
Claim 5. Under a construal of many as an intensional quanti er, the restrictor may change the probabilities within its nuclear scope by conditionalization. Asymmetry may then arise from (local) context change n-is-many x ('; ) i \it is probable, given there are j'j x '-x's, that 9 <n x('^ )" i p(fw : j'^ j x;w < ngjfw : j'j x;w = j'j x g) > c : Note that all '-x's count the same when relativizing to the condition j'j x;w = j'j x . A minor emendation is suggested by certain (admittedly) marginal cases like (8) , in which there is a logical connection between the arguments of many. To validate sentences of the form (8a), let us add the disjunct \jA \ Bj could not have been > n" (taking both < n and > n into account), so that n-is-many x ('; ) i p(fw : j'^ j x;w < ngjW ';x ) > c or p(fw : j'^ j x;w > ngjW ';x ) = 0
where W ';x is an abbreviation for the set fw : j'j x;w = j'j x g. The additional disjunct would, for the case n = 0, make absurd sentences of the form (8b) true | but fortunately (v) skips over n = 0. 4 Note that we have derived an asymmetric reading from a symmetric one via conditionalization, without making reference to the fraction k in line (ii). One candidate for k is the relative frequency jBj jV j of B (where V is the set of all objects) considered in Westerst ahl 14]. However, instantiating (ii) with this value yields the symmetric reading many(A; B) i jA \ Bj > jBj jV j jAj :
The idea that some notion of frequency is related to the proportional reading carries, nonetheless, some plausibility. Commenting on the proportional reading, Partee 11] writes
One subtlety that deserves further investigation is that when the restrictor does involve a very open-ended set, \proportion" : : : becomes ill-de ned, and some extended sense of \frequency" may be needed, including an atemporal sense conceptualized in terms of an imagined survey of the given domain. Proportion proper may then be viewable as a special case of frequency.
It is instructive at this point to return to our discussion in x2:1 of probabilities and (non-)extensionality. Notions of frequency underly a conception of probabilities de ned on (sets of) objects (in, for example, a rst-order model), as opposed to subjective notions of belief which lead to a de nition of probabilities on (sets of) possible worlds. Now, in Partee's \imagined survey", it is, according to Claim 4 (in x2:1), the sampling situations (completed into worlds) on which probabilities should be de ned. Thus, rather than taking the conditional probability p(BjA) viii) . We conjecture, however, that discrepancies at individual models evaporate once we turn our attention to what is valid at all models satisfying certain natural conditions. These conditions concern the ingredients p, c and employed above, about which we have so far been deliberately vague.
Some loose ends
Turning to the numbers c and that quantify just how well is \well" in Claim 3 (i.e., n C's are many when jCj could well have been < n), let us rst observe that the passage from x2:1 to x2:2 via conditionalization can be strengthened (i.e., reversed), provided the same values for c and are used in analyzing the cardinal and proportional readings. More precisely, observe that we might derive a cardinal reading from a proportional reading by stipulating n-IS-MANY x ( ) i n-is-many x (x = x; ) :
Claim 6. The unary predicate many (in x2:1) can be derived from the binary relation many (in x2:2) by putting the common noun predicate in the nuclear scope.
Claim 6 asserts that the cardinal reading from line (vi) (in x2:1) can be obtained from line (ix), under the de nition of n-is-many x speci ed by line (vii) or (viii) (in x2:2). Again, such equivalences may not hold at any xed model, but only between certain models where the cardinality jV j of the universal set V is su ciently larger than jCj (and jAj and jBj) so that the restriction to worlds with a xed cardinality has no e ect on our expectations about C (or A or B).
A consequence of Claim 6 of potentially wider linguistic interest is the suggestion that an existential reading of Many x('; ) moves ' over to be conjoined with | rather than over to '. That is, there are many C's i many(V; C) ; instead of the equivalence there are many C's i many(C; V ) adopted (for instance) in Partee 11]. 1 2 or (viii) where = 1. Under the cardinal reading (vi), (9a) would imply (9c). But do we always want to infer (9c), given (9a)?
With a bit more work, we might argue that for any positive integer m, it would be wrong to require of all models that c and be greater than Intensionality Hypothesis. There are enough possible worlds di erentiating distinct properties so that c and need not depend on the arguments of many, but can, for any given model, stay xed. The Intensionality Hypothesis is very possibly the most problematic (and interesting) point of the present work. Can any two judgments n-is-many x ('; ) and n-is-many x (' 0 ; 0 ) be glued together by a common bound c or ? Or are probabilities de ned on total worlds overkill, in which case would we be better advised to base our estimation of when n -x's are many some other way? What matters ultimately, we believe, is not so much the interpretation of many at any particular model, but rather the validities and rules predicted by quantifying over a suitable collection of these models (with di erent p's, c's and 's). These validities and rules may turn out to be so trivial as to admit a simpler non-probabilistic semantic interpretation, pushing the elimination of numbers from probabilities in Segerberg 13] further. Unfortunately, we must leave the development of such technical points to another paper.
Discussion
The fundamental intuition about many on which x2 rests is expressed by Claim 3, n C's are many when jCj could well have been < n. It is natural to interpret the phrase \could well have been" relative to what we know about C, which, comprising only a small part of the information encoded in the actual world, leads to so-called subjective probabilities, requiring (in turn) an intensional framework. 6 
Expecting many readings
While it is plausible to assume that expectations must ultimately be grounded in the actual world, exactly how that comes about is undoubtedly an extremely complicated story. We need not spin such a tale, however, in order to give an extensional analysis of many that goes beyond simply assuming that context spits out n. A step in this direction is to follow Lappin 10] and add a comparison set argument to many, turning it into a ternary predicate ambiguous between many 1 (A; B; C) i jA \ Bj > jA \ Cj and many 2 (A; B; C) i jA \ Bj > jB \ Cj ; suitable for sentences such as (11) . (11) Many lawyers are criminals, as compared to doctors. But what do we do with sentences that do not spell out a comparison set C? A framework eliciting missing arguments from context is the alternative semantics for focus of Rooth 12] . The idea is that an utterance of a sentence speci es an expression in focus (written between brackets ] F ), that is (somehow) assigned a set A of alternatives, relative to which the truth of the sentence is evaluated. For example, Lappin 10] 's interpretations of (11) amount to an alternative semantics for (12b) and (12c), with the alternative set A = fdoctorsg. The matter becomes more complicated in case the set A of alternatives has more than one element. This possibility is considered carefully in Babko 2]'s analysis of cardinal many as a focus-sensitive quanti er, for which a bit of notation comes in handy. Let be a formula with a free variable x, such as lawyer(x)^criminal(x), and suppose e is a subexpression in that is in focus. Given an element a in the alternative set A, let a e be the formula obtained by replacing e in by a. 7 A simple proposal for when n -x's can be deemed many (relative to A) is n -x's are many (relative to A) i (8a 2 A) jfx : a e gj < n : (x) Babko dismisses (x) and any characterization that depends only on the cardinality of A and the number of a's in A for which jfx : a e gj < n. Instead, she calculates a lower bound for n, using (in an essential way) the numbers jfx : a e gj de ned by alternatives a in A. And even then, she acknowledges \potential problems with such de nitions." Now, the relevance of this little digression to our analysis (x2) is that if we introduce into the formula a variable w for the world (taking intensions to extensions) on which to apply ] F (setting e to w), then our probabilistic proposals can be viewed as special cases of the alternative scheme above, where A is some set of possible worlds (restricted in the case of x2:2 to worlds meeting some condition imposed by the restrictor ' in Many x('; )). Instead of (x), we have n -x's are many i fa 2 A : jfx : a w gj < ng is a \sizable" subset of A (xi) for some notion of \sizable" subset de ned by a probability function p and number c (or ). 8 By weakening the universal quanti er in (x), (xi) reduces the demands on the context to specify A as precisely as it must under (x).
Within the alternative semantics of focus, our account is distinguished by the application of ] F to an implicit intensional argument. This bit of intensionality might be avoided by applying ] F instead to an explicit argument. Babko states that : : : the alternative semantics of focus is all that is needed in order to adequately account for the context-dependency of`many' and`few '. This claim is somewhat unsettling to the extent that (a) the alternative semantics of focus stops at some presumed boundary between semantics and pragmatics, 9 and (b) the contention that many is extensional is defended by erecting such borders. To our knowledge, Babko makes no such defense. She does consider a di erent analysis of many based on focus due to Herburger 5] , under which \the cardinal/proportional distinction does not coincide with Milsark's strong/weak distinction," and goes on to write
b. There are many criminals who are lawyers. c. Many lawyers are criminals. d. Many criminals are lawyers. Even if an appeal is allowed to some topic/focus structure to transform (13a,b) to what amount to proportional readings of (13c,d), it is di cult to resist the nagging sense that there is something wrong in insisting on the semantic principle that cardinal equals weak and proportional equals strong, only to fall back on pragmatics to account for (pragmatically innocent) counter-examples of the form There are many A's who are B's.
Turning our attention back to the case where A is a set of possible worlds, let us acknowledge that even in this case, general questions of (a) contextdependence and of (b) where A comes from remain. Item (a) is taken up very brie y in the next section; (b) in the section after that.
3.2. The xed context assumption, extensionality, vagueness and ambiguity reconsidered Barwise and Cooper 3]'s \ xed context assumption" stating that \there is a rich context held xed that determines the precise meaning for" (among other expressions) many is challenged above not only by the claim that extensions are not quite \rich" enough (Claim 2), but also by our appeal, for an asymmetric reading, to context change, in the form of conditionalization of probabilities. Since this conditionalization is local to the scope, one might want to discount this context change, and portray it as an ordinary case of context-dependence (whatever that amounts to). As we will see shortly, however, there could well be other situations where conditionalization is not local. At any rate, the proposal above to (re-)analyze there are many C's as many(V; C) (where V can be read: \vacuous") is meant to suggest that this context-dependence consists of some form of domain restriction (relating the adjectival and determiner readings of many).
Describing context-dependence can (needless to say) be a tricky matter, even when the task is simply to decide when it is that context resolves vagueness, and when it is that it resolves ambiguity. As a rst approximation, one might say that vagueness has to do with choosing the model against which to evaluate a logical form; by contrast, ambiguity concerns the choice of logical form (to evaluate). Stated this way, notions of vagueness and ambiguity presuppose a xed conception of logical form and model. That is, the demarcation between vagueness and ambiguity varies with di erent notions of logical form and model | which can get quite confusing when it is not clear just what can be put into the logical form. For example, adding the annotation ] F from Rooth 12] leads to (a) ambiguity because it can be attached to di erent expressions in a sentence, and to (b) vagueness insofar as there is a choice in the alternative set to interpret a xed attachment. As for the probabilistic analyses presented above, the Intensionality Hypothesis in x2:3 says that the choice of c and is up to the model, not the logical form (as c and are independent of the arguments of many). In that respect, the indeterminacy in c and (as well as p) leads to vagueness, not ambiguity.
That is not to say, of course, that ambiguity does not arise when using expectations. In addition to the cardinal/proportional ambiguity, there are various expectations to keep track of, leading to di erent readings. Consider sentence (14) , which would seem paradoxical under a reading of many as more than (could have been) expected. (14) As expected, many students arrived today. Such a contradiction is easy enough to resolve along the following lines: the expectation underlying many above might concern arrivals on days other than, or in addition to, today; the expectation referred to in as expected pertains speci cally to today. More generally, all kinds of probabilities might be involved, conditionalized on, or applied to, any number of things.
Playing with expectations
We close with a puzzle that begins by asking for lower bounds on many for each line of (15) . (15) a. Many people came to the colloquium.
b. Chomsky spoke. Many people came to the colloquium. c. Tim spoke. Many people came to the colloquium. Chances are it is easier to pick out a number for (15b) than for (15a), and that the number for (15c) is far lower than (15b), due to the acceptability of (16). (16) a. If Chomsky speaks, many people will come to the colloquium.
b. If Tim speaks, not many people will come to the colloquium. Now, the puzzle is that the set A of possible worlds on which n-is-many x is evaluated seems to change in (15b) and (15c) but not in (16a) or (16b). 10 Evidently, A is not immune to the rst sentences in (15b) and (15c), but escapes update by the antecedents in (16a) and (16b). We are not sure exactly how to account for this discrepancy. One clue is that, in contrast to (15) , many is used in (16) not to report a particular incident, but rather to express expectations, such as (17). (17) Many birds y.
(Curiously, the expectations raised by (16) would seem to work towards making (15b) and (15c) equally likely | perhaps to increase their information content.) Just what the existential import of (16) or (17) is falls outside the scope of the present work, although it is easy enough to assign (16) and (17) In any case, neither of us currently believes that the extensionality claim is correct. 2 As argued in Kamp and Reyle 8] , NPs beginning with many do not introduce set discourse referents directly, but only via Abstraction, as in
This is to make sure that the many phrase receives a distributive interpretation. For the discussions in this paper, the di erence is of no importance. 3 The term \possible world" may be somewhat misleading in this context, for there are many cases where we think of the alternative situations in terms of which the norm is determined as alternative situations in the actual world.
See in this connection x3:1. 4 It is possible that because we perceive that the norm strategy clearly makes no sense for a sentence like (8a), we are provoked into another interpretation strategy that is more appropriate to it. Adding the alternative possibility as another disjunct to the truth clause may not be the optimal way of accounting for this. We will leave this problem to a companion paper which addresses the logic which our semantics generates. 5 As pointed out by C. Condoravdi, the proposal to re-analyze there are many C's as many(V; C), rather than many(C; V ), can be made without bringing in the issue of intensionality, contrary to the presentation above. Setting intensionality aside, one might ask whether the manner in which the arguments of a determiner are instantiated re ects more generally the weak/strong ambiguity of quanti ers Q. In particular, does not the vacuous restriction in Q(V; C) support (or otherwise relate to) the contention (e.g., in Zucchi 15] ) that weak NPs are not subject to Heim 4] 's Descriptive Content Condition (inasmuch as the only presupposition Q(V; C) adds is that the universe V be non-empty)? Note that the interpretation of the adjective many (under a weak existential reading) makes essential use only of the nuclear scope. By contrast, the restrictor plays an indispensable role for strong quanti ers such as most (e.g., Kamp 7] ) and, under a proportional reading, many. 6 The word \subjective" in subjective probabilities suggests that the collection of possible worlds represents the doxastic alternatives entertained by an idealized logically omniscient agent, and that if we are to go beyond this idealization, intensionality must give way to intentionality. 7 Interpreting many relative to extensional alternatives a e is faithful to Claim 3 only insofar as a e resemble , so that the switch a=e could be viewed intensionally as moving to a most \similar world" modulo a=e. The question is would the word \expection" still be interesting after its meaning is stretched far enough to cover any such alternative semantics for many? 8 Our probabilistic approach constitutes a qualitative alternative to calculating the expectation E(v) of a random variable v E(v) = X n p(v = n) :
The latter (quantitative) approach comes closer to Babko's aforementioned lower bounds for n. 9 By contrast, let us cite Asher 1] as a daring work that pushes the analysis of context-dependence beyond such borders.
